Israeli Interests in the Second Gulf War

Came across this article as a reference in the (so-far) excellent book The Transparent Cabal: The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel. I had heretofore been unaware that one of the results of the *first* Gulf War was the expulsion of nearly all Palestinians from Kuwait...
Israel: the ultimate winner
Saleh Abdel-Jawwad* examines, why Israel wanted the war against Iraq
Abdul-Jawwad Saleh An important question which continues to surface in the war against Iraq relates to Israel and the effort by the Zionist lobby to push the war option on the American administration as well as the American public. In other words, what are the goals that Israel seeks to achieve from the war in Iraq and how will it impact the Palestinian file?
First, Israel regards any strike against the Arabs, and particularly a chief enemy like Iraq, a major blow to the Arab order as well as weakening the position of the Palestinians. After the Camp David Accords in 1979, Egypt operationally removed itself (and continued to do so until present) from the 'Arab/Israeli' conflict, while intertwining its interests with the United States. Since then Israel has shifted its attention to Iraq, given its status as the sole remaining Arab country to have a powerful mix of resources unavailable to other Arab regimes: petrol, financial assets, plentiful water supplies, significant fertile soil, a sufficiently large population, a clear nationalist political agenda, and military, industrial and scientific infrastructure.
Second, war against Iraq will likely lead to dissolution of the country, even if this is not an immediate American plan. Such dissolution would be in accordance with Israel's vision of the region, and would greatly enhance Israel's power. This regional vision is based on a 19th and 20th century orientalist perspective of the Middle East. According to this view the region is seen as a mosaic composed of many ethnic groups, cultures and nationalities. Furthermore, Iraqi residents are also divided along Sunni, Shi'ite, Kurd, and Christian lines. Likewise there are powerful regional, denominational, and tribal allegiances concentrated around economic and politically important cities such as Baghdad, Tikrit, Basra, and Mosul. A mosaic perspective of Iraq would reject Arab national ideology and the relationship of Palestine to the Arabs. It would also legitimise Zionism, based on the idea of Jewish nationalism and power for the weak.
Abba Eban succinctly described Israeli Zionist ideology in this respect, in his collection of writings entitled The Voice of Israel. Eban contests the assumption that the Middle East represents a cultural unit, and that it is incumbent upon Israel to integrate within this unit. Instead he 'clarifies' that the Arabs always lived disparately and that the short periods of unity only took place under the power of the sword. He continues by describing how political divisions were not introduced by Western colonialism, and stresses that the cultural and traditional ties which unite Arab countries are insufficient to form the base upon which political unity can be achieved.
For this reason, successive Israeli governments have adopted policies based on the principle of supporting non-Arab ethnic minorities such as the Kurds in Iraq or the Maronites in Lebanon. Literature on the Zionist movement -- particularly those published at the end of the 1930s and the beginning of the Arabisation of the Palestinian question -- indicate that the Zionist leaders in general, and yeshiva leaders in particular, placed their hopes and concerns on establishing relationships with every minority within the Arab world and neighbouring non-Arab countries.
Since the end of the 1930s, Ben Gurion articulated some principles which would become indisputable Zionist tenets:
1.The Arabs are the primary enemy of the Zionist movement. To confront this chief enemy, it is necessary for Zionism to search for allies in the East to stand with its allies in the West. These are needed to act as a counter force and support the power of the Zionist project when faced with this (primary) confrontation. At the end of the day it is a 'bloody struggle between us and them'. Therefore, any group or sect which opposes Arab nationalism -- "the primary enemy of the Jewish people"-- or is prepared to fight against it, is an ally which helps Zionism implement its settlement and state-driven policies.
2.The Jewish people, who have been subjected to the terrorism and oppression of various governments, and particularly those who lived in Arab countries, perceive all minorities and groups "oppressed" by the Arabs or Muslims as allies and partners. Thus the need to free oneself from this oppression is felt and in common to both.
The two principles above form the basis of what is known as the 'Theory of Allying the Periphery.'
3.After the establishment of the state of Israel, Ben Gurion hoped to develop this theory further and create a ring of adversaries around the Arab countries. He focused his on attention on building strategic relationships with Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia (Encirclement Theory). He also aimed to expand the links of this encirclement against the Arab world by expanding Israel's relationships with other Asian and African countries. The most recent phase of this policy focuses on India -- largely as a result of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons, the emergence of Hindu revisionism in India, and the desire to penetrate India's enormous market.
Ben Gurion's ideas (the Theory of allying the periphery and the Theory of encirclement) which were formulated with other Zionist leaders, have provided the basis for interacting with allies in regards to the Arab world.
It is against this backdrop that Israel has supported secessionist movements in Sudan, Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon and any secessionist movements in the Arab world which Israel considers an enemy. Yet the concern for Iraq and its attempts to weaken or prevent it from developing its strengths has always been a central Zionist objective. At times, Israel succeeded in gaining a foothold in Iraq by forging secret yet strong relationships with leaders from the Kurdish movement. In sharp contrast it failed to gain allies amongst the Coptic community in Egypt primarily because of the historical continuity of the Egyptian state.
Communications with the Kurds began at the end of the 1930s. The responsibility of establishing contacts with the Kurds fell to the infamous Zionist intelligence operative Rubin Shiluah -- one of the important planners and thinkers of the strategy of "allying the periphery".
Shiluah, who at the time was living as a spy in Iraq -- under the guise of studying at a Jewish school in Baghdad -- would take trips to the mountainous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. The relationships he formed there towards the end of the 1940s were primarily with Kurds who were willing to help Iraqi Jews reach Palestine through Turkey.
By the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s, Israel became the primary source of arms and military training for the Kurds in their fight against the Iraqi central government. While full details have yet to be revealed, thousands of Mossad agents and Israeli military personnel were located throughout northern Iraq under different covers (military advisors, agricultural experts, trainers, and doctors); Israeli support for the Kurds peaked during the second Gulf War after the Kurdish takeover of strategically important and oil rich Kirkuk. The secessionist movement, however, quickly collapsed after heavy military blows from the Iraqi army before the United States imposed changes that ended control of the centralised government and established an area of Kurdish sovereignty.
Similarly, Israel supported the Shah of Iran in its struggle against Baghdad. The beginning of Israel's relationship with the Shah was formed when the Mossad, acting in accord with British (MI6) and American (CIA) intelligence, worked to bring about the collapse of the democratically elected Iranian leader Mossadeq in 1953. Their role remains a secret to this day. The relationship forged with the Shah enabled Iran to be the primary importer of Israeli products until the rise of Khomeni. Israel also played a role in training the SAVAK, the infamous and brutal intelligence service which protected the Shah.
Likewise, Israel has worked closely to monitor Iraq, and has done everything in its power to prevent it from developing nuclear capabilities. In this context, Israel destroyed the Iraqi reactor during its assembly in France in 1977. It also assassinated scientists who worked in the Iraqi nuclear programme -- most notably the Egyptian scientist Yehya El-Mashd who was assassinated in Paris. They also assassinated the brainchild of the Super Canon in Brussels, and destroyed the Usaris Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. At the same time Israel provided arms to Iran during the first Gulf War.
Israeli enmity towards Iraq precedes the Saddam Hussein regime -- originating after Iraq participated in the 1948 War. At the time, Iraq was the sole country participating in the war which refused to participate in the negotiations leading up to the Rhodes Armistice agreement in 1949. Likewise, Iraq sent reinforcements to the Jordanian front in 1967. In addition, Iraq continues to refuse to acknowledge UN Resolution 242 and was actively engaged in the defense of Damascus in 1973.
Third, war as an end in and of itself, is an ever- present Israeli objective. Sequential wars with the Arab world have given Israel opportunities to exhaust the Arab world, as well as tipping the demographic and political situation against Palestinians. Even regional wars which Israel has not participated in have benefited Israel and weakened the Palestinian national movement The first and second Gulf War are a few examples.
The War of 1948 resulted in the expulsion of 800,000 Palestinians, representing 87 per cent of the population to come under Zionist control. The War of 1956, according to declassified Israeli documents, relating to the Kufr Qasem Massacre, sought to facilitate a new wave of expulsions and to bring about the occupation of the West Bank. The expulsion of 400,000 Palestinians during the 1967 War, and the subsequent occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, further facilitated Israel's ambitions as a regional powerhouse. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 also resulted in dangerous demographic changes for Palestinian refugees. Of the 450,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon in 1982, no more than 250,000 remain today. (Had the war not taken place, the number of Palestinians in Lebanon would have reached at least 650,000). Not to mention the social, morale and political subjugation the Palestinians in Lebanon faced as a result of that war.
The first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran also disempowered the Palestinian cause: the Arab world was split into two camps, Arab resources were squandered, oil income was depleted, and Arab attention was taken away from the Palestinian question. This all negatively impacted the Palestinian position.
Finally, the second Gulf War of 1991 resulted in the expulsion of the Palestinian community from Kuwait, which formed one of the primary arteries of Palestinian income and power in the occupied territories. In my opinion, Yitshak Shamir sought, through the implementation of the 1990 Massacre, to exploit these events by creating a dynamic that would result in the expulsion of West Bank residents. The massacre took place within the Haram Al-Sharif compound three months before the outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War. Israeli forces opened fire on Palestinian demonstrators, killing twenty. Yet at the time, the American administration which hoped to preserve the Arab alliance in the war against Iraq, was one of the main reasons which prevented Shamir from realising his plans.
* The writer is a professor at Beir Zeit University.
© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved
Expulsion of Palestinians from Kuwait in 1991
Palestinian expulsion from Kuwait
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Palestinian expulsion from Kuwait or 1991 Palestinian exodus from Kuwait took place at the end of the Gulf War, when Kuwait expelled almost 450,000 Palestinians.[1] The policy which led to this exodus was a response to the alignment of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and the PLO with Saddam Hussein, who had earlier invaded Kuwait. The exodus took place during one week in March 1991, following Kuwait's liberation from Iraqi occupation. The story received little media attention in the aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait.
Contents
1 Background
2 Exodus
3 Aftermath
4 Responses
5 See also
6 Notes
Background
Prior to the exodus, Palestinians made up about 30% of Kuwait's population of 2.2 million.[2] More 400,000 Palestinian Arabs and their descendants resided in Kuwait in 1990.[3] Palestinians arrived to Kuwait in three different phases, beginning with the large scale development of oil production, coinciding with the 1948-1949 dispersion.[3] Later, Palestinians arrived to Kuwait promarily from Jordan, attracted by favorable conditions of high education and employment through 1960s and 1970s.
Exodus
The policy which led to this exodus was a response to the alignment of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and the PLO with Saddam Hussein, who had earlier invaded Kuwait. The exodus took place during one week in March 1991, following Kuwait's liberation from Iraqi occupation. On March 14, only 150,000 Palestinians were still residing in Kuwait, out of initial 450,000 - many of them fearful for their fate.[4]
In total, Kuwait expelled 443,000 Palestinians.[1] Several Palestinians were killed by vigilante groups including some with links to the royal family.[5] With the completion of the exodus only 7,000 Palestinians remained.[1]
Aftermath
Only a few thousand Palestinians stayed behind or have returned since.[6] By 2006, only a few had returned to Kuwait and today the number of Palestinians living in Kuwait is less than 40,000 (under 3% of the population).[citation needed]
In 2004, Kuwait allegedly put off a planned visit by Mahmoud Abbas, then the number two PLO official after Arafat.[6] Palestinian officials denied reports that this was because he would not apologize for Arafat's support for the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.[6] However, on December 12, 2004, Abbas, now the Palestinian leader, apologized for the PLO's support of Saddam Hussein during the invasion.[7] On the first visit to Kuwait by a top Palestinian official since the invasion by Iraq, Abbas said: "I say we yes, we apologize over our stand towards Kuwait."[6]
Responses
Kuwait According to the New Yok Times, Kuwaitis said the anger against Palestinians was such that there was little chance most of those who had left during the seven-month occupation can ever come back to live here again and relatively few of those remaining will be able to stay.[4]
See also
1991 uprisings in Iraq
1948 Palestinian exodus
Jewish exodus from Arab countries
Notes
^ a b c d [1], BBC News, May 30, 2001
^ Kuwait - Population
^ a b [2]
^ a b [3]
^ Crystal, Jill. "Kuwait: Post-War Society". The Persian Gulf States: A Country Study. Library of Congress. Retrieved 5 March 2011.
^ a b c d [4]
^ Abbas apology to Kuwait over Iraq, BBC News, December 12, 2004
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Palestinian_expulsion_from_Kuwait&oldid=499115628"
the "linkage" issue
http://www.gulfwar1991.com/Gulf%20War%20Complete/Chapter%208,%20Peace%20...
The Gulf War:
Overreaction & Excessiveness
By Hassan A El-Najjar
Amazone Press, 2001
The Root of Subsequent US Invasion of the Middle East
How America was dragged into conflict
with the Arab and Muslim worlds
========
CHAPTER VIII
PEACE INITIATIVES
As Iraq had been accorded the status of an adversary well before its invasion of Kuwait, the war option was more preferred to any peaceful solutions to end the crisis. That was why the Bush administration kept rejecting every single peace initiative offered by Iraq or by various intermediaries. The vast majority of these initiatives were rejected using a pretext that became known as "linkage."
This chapter starts with an investigation of that “linkage” excuse. This is followed by a review of the major peace initiatives, which were rejected as a result of that excuse, including the well-publicized Geneva Meeting. This chapter also sheds some light on the attempts of Democrats in the Congress to avoid war by trying to convince the administration to use economic sanctions instead. Leading Democrats, Such as Senator Sam Nunn, were ridiculed for their “peaceful” behavior, so were the Soviet “Arabists.” The chapter draws heavily on three major sources: memoirs of President Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft,[1] memoirs of the Secretary of State James Baker,[2] and the Senate hearings conducted by Senator Sam Nunn.[3] Using these three major sources to analyze how the administration behaved during the crisis allows us to avoid any disputes over accuracy of mentioned events.
The Linkage Impasse
The first Iraqi offer to withdraw from Kuwait reached the Bush administration on August 11, 1990, almost a week after the invasion. Iraq offered withdrawal from Kuwait in return for access to the Gulf and negotiations on oil prices.[4] The initiative was dismissed outright because withdrawal was “conditional.”
On the following day, August 12, the Iraqi President announced another proposal that was also rejected instantly because it included a "linkage." Iraq offered withdrawal from Kuwait without any territorial or oil conditions, this time, in return for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories.[5] The administration rejected that initiative, too, because it would lead to exerting pressure on Israel to observe the U.N. Resolutions 242, 338, and 425 which called for the Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories it occupied in 1967 and 1982.[6]
But why did the Bush administration miss that opportunity to achieve a peaceful Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the same time? The answer lies in the influence of the pro-Likude specialists in the administration.[7] Shimon Peres bitterly complained that Shamir rejected his successful agreement with King Hussain in London, in 1987, to start the peace process. They agreed to open direct negotiations between Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation under the aegis of an international conference.[8]
In 1988, three prominent specialists in the administration, Dennis Ross, Richard Haass, and Martin Indyk, wrote a policy recommendation report that has remained as the guiding reference for American foreign policy in the Middle East. In that report, they took the Shamir side recommending that the U.S. should not seek a rapid breakthrough in the peace process. Rather, they suggested that the U.S. should engage in a gradual “ripening process.”[9] In other words, they were against the idea of the U.N. international conference. The Bush administration=s observance of these recommendations explains why it continued rejecting any “linkage” between ending the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories.
In addition, supporters of Israel in the Bush administration saw the coming war as an opportunity to destroy Israel=s most "hated" enemy, Iraq. Therefore, it would be inconsistent for them to accept Iraqi peace initiatives even in return for a promise to address the Israeli occupation, later.
Thus, during the second NSC meeting after the invasion, in August 3, Deputy Secretary of State, Larry Eagleburger, warned that Saudi Arabia would be Saddam's next objective, and that over time he would control OPEC and oil prices.[10] "If he succeeds, then he will target Israel," Eagleburger added.[11]
The President's National Security Advisor, General Brent Scowcroft echoed Eagleburger=s argument saying: "In taking on Saddam Hussein diplomatically, and eventually militarily, we (would be) tackling one of their (the Israelis') principal enemies and probably their most hated adversary."[12]
As a result of setting these guidelines for him, President Bush followed Eagleburger and Scowcroft. He expressed his concern about the Soviet talk regarding a comprehensive peace settlement and a Middle East peace conference. He felt that such a conference would include trying to solve the question of the occupied Arab territories. He could not imagine forcing Israel to abide by the international law as he wanted Iraq to do unconditionally. Therefore, he considered such solutions as a "linkage of the Gulf crisis with the Arab-Israeli confrontation" that had to be avoided.[13]
Had the Bush administration followed one-standard in conducting its foreign policy, the Iraqi offer to withdraw from Kuwait in return for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories should have been welcomed. In fact, the Bush administration was frustrated by the reluctance of the Israeli government of Shamir to commit itself to any peaceful resolution for the Palestinian problem.
About a year before the invasion, Secretary of State James Baker gave a speech in the annual political conference of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in which he criticized the expansionist policies of the Israeli government.[14] He said: “for Israel, now is the time to lay aside once and for all the unrealistic vision of a Greater Israel.”[15]
The Shamir government was defiant and continued building Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, in violation of the international law that prohibits occupiers from doing so. Successive American administrations, Democratic and Republican alike, opposed that Israeli expansionist policy. The Carter administration called these settlements as “illegal,” and the Reagan-Bush administrations described them as “obstacles for peace.”[16] President Bush stated publicly that “the foreign policy of the United States says that we do not believe there should be new settlements in the West Bank or East Jerusalem.”[17]
In response, Bush and Baker were furiously attacked by supporters of Israel in the Congress. Moreover, the Israeli government became more defiant than before. On October 16, 1989, Shamir rejected a plan to start negotiations with an elected Palestinian delegation. He said that “he would not compromise with the Palestinians, even if it meant the collapse of his government and a sharper conflict with the United States.”[18]
During a Congressional hearing on June 11, 1990, Congressman Mel Levine of California, a fervent supporter of Israel, suggested that the peace process had been sabotaged by the President=s remarks about settlements and Jerusalem. At that moment, Baker exploded saying to the Israelis and their supporters: “When you=re serious about peace, call us. The White House number is 1-202-456-1414."[19] As a result, formal communications between the U.S. government and the Israeli government stopped. An informal channel was kept open with Dennis Ross representing the State Department and Martin Indyk representing Israel.[20]
Although opposing the Israeli expansionist policies was a very brave position for Bush and Baker, it proved to be very costly. They lost their jobs in 1992 despite their five great services for Israel. First, they worked hard to allow hundreds of thousands of Russian, Syrian, and Ethiopian Jews to immigrate to Israel and helped settle them there. Second, they succeeded in repealing the 1975 UN resolution, which equated Zionism with racism although the basis for that resolution was still there.[21] Israeli governments have continued to allow only Jews to immigrate to Israel while denying the rights of the Palestinian people to return to their country simply because they are not Jews. Third, they helped Israel establish diplomatic relations with forty-four countries, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Actually, it became something like a rite of passage for new Eastern European leaders to pay their respect and pledge their allegiance to Israel. The first thing several of them did after assuming office was paying a visit to Israel. Fourth, by insisting on the war to resolve the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis, the Bush administration succeeded in destroying Iraq, as the perceived strategic threat to Israel. Finally, the Bush administration brought Israel=s Arab neighbors to the peace table for direct negotiations, something they never wanted to do while Israel was occupying their lands. Such direct negotiations represented a de facto recognition of Israel that Israelis sought for more than forty years.[22]
More Rejected Initiatives
The third peace initiative was also rejected because of "linkage." It was proposed on September 9, 1990 during a meeting between Bush and Gorbachev. The Soviets knew that they lost the Cold War and that they were no longer capable of supporting Third World countries. Consequently, all what they could do was proposing peace initiatives that were all rejected one after the other. During that meeting, the Soviet President, Gorbachev, brought out a proposal to end the crisis peacefully. Iraq offered to release the hostages, withdraw from Kuwait, and restore the Kuwaiti government. In return, the United States would promise (just a promise) that it would not strike Iraq and would reduce its forces in the area, which would be replaced by an Arab peace-keeping force. An agreement for an international conference on the Middle East would follow. Once again, the initiative was rejected by President Bush as a linkage.[23]
As Scowcroft put it: "To me, saving face for Iraq, or a partial withdrawal, a promise not to attack, and, above all linkage with the Arab-Israeli issue, would change the path we were on in fundamental way." Gorbachev's proposal was discussed briefly before being rejected by the President and his advisors: Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, John Sununu, John Kelly, Dennis Ross, Condi Rice, and Richard Haass.[24]
Dennis Ross played a major role in persuading Secretary Baker, and through him President Bush, to reject the “linkage” argument. He was mad when he sensed that Baker was ready to discuss it. “He was impassioned almost to the point of intemperance,” as he addressed Baker saying: “You can=t do that. This will absolutely undercut what we=re trying to do. We=ll put the moderate Arabs in a position where Saddam is delivering for the Palestinians and they are not. If we create linkage, he can claim victory.” That was enough to persuade Baker who, by turn, persuaded the President using the same angry tone he heard from Dennis Ross. When Baker told President Bush not to worry about the conference idea, he replied: “Well, I=ve got to worry about it. I put all those kids out there. Nobody else did it -- I did it. And I=ve got to take every step to be sure that I don=t put their lives at risk needlessly. If I can get them out of there without fighting, I=ll do it.” That was a golden opportunity for the Arab-American, John Sununu, to break the silence and to try to avoid Arab bloodshed. He said, “maybe we can put a reference to an international conference in there.” However, he was silenced instantly by James Baker who told him “to get off of it.” At that moment, the President knew that his Secretary of State was committed to the anti-linkage argument. As a result, he gave up saying: “Look, Jimmy, if you can get the statement without it, fine.” [25]
Consequently, Dennis Ross worked with his Soviet counterpart, Sergie Tarasenko, to produce the statement that was to the satisfaction of the administration. It concluded with language that sidestepped "linkage." However, to please Gorbachev, it mentioned that it was essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and the Gulf. President Bush was excited because the statement "headed off another attempt to link the crisis with Israel."[26]
Thus, the Bush administration rejected this Soviet initiative that could have resolved the conflict peacefully. The administration preferred to go to war to destroy Iraq rather than promising to address the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories. This position continued even after being confronted with possible casualty figures, which were estimated in the thousands if Iraq would use chemical and biological weapons.[27] This was evidence on the Bush administration’s willingness to sacrifice the lives of thousands of American soldiers in order to help Israel continue its occupation of the Arab territories. More and more Peace initiatives continued to be proposed, just to be rejected with cold blood.
Another Soviet-brokered peace initiative was also rejected as a "linkage." On October 4-5, 1990, Primakov's visit to Baghdad resulted in a new Iraqi initiative. Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait in exchange for access to the Gulf and a promise to address the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories. Two days later, on October 7, President Bush instructed Secretary Baker to announce the rejection of the initiative.[28]
Thus, automatic rejection of peace initiatives on basis of "linkage" marked the Bush administration's double-standard approach in international relations. In particular, it portrayed the administration as the protector of the Israeli aggression and occupation. When it was forced by events to change that image a little bit, it back lashed against the President. On October 8, Israeli troops fired into Muslim worshipers in Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.[29] They killed 21 and injured more than 150 Muslim worshippers. President Bush had to agree to a resolution in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemning Israel for the use of excessive force and calling for a committee to investigate how Palestinians can be protected. However, the Shamir government refused to cooperate with the UN committee. Supporters of that government among Jewish Americans were surprised, hurt, and furious for the position of the Bush administration that allowed the resolution to pass. That position, together with his refusal to give Shamir the loan guarantees to build settlements in the West bank, later, led to losing their support for his reelection in 1992.[30]
Then, several peace initiatives followed. All attempted to convince the Bush administration to allow Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait without punishment or even with symbolic face saving, but in vain. During the November 19 meeting between Bush and Gorbachev, the Soviet President brought another peace initiative from Primakov. He said that Iraq would agree to withdraw from Kuwait in exchange for access to the Gulf. Although this initiative did not include any "linkage," it was also rejected by the Bush administration because withdrawal "was tied to a condition."[31]
On November 29, directly after the U.N. vote that authorized the use of force against Iraq, Foreign Ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council met for a celebration. During that meeting, Sheverdnadze launched a peace initiative. He suggested that Iraq be given assurances that it would not be attacked while withdrawing. He was supported by the British, French, and Chinese Foreign Ministers right away. Moreover, they expressed their readiness to send bilateral and collective messages of assurance to Iraq. However, Secretary Baker and President Bush adamantly rejected this initiative like they did to the previous ones. They would not allow any assurances or guarantees.[32]
Moreover, President Bush and his advisors expressed their anger against Soviet “Arabists”[33] for their stance against the use of force. Actually, those “Arabists” represented one of the two competing groups in the Soviet Foreign Ministry bureaucracy. While Shevardnadze led the pro-Western group, Primakov led the “Arabists,” in an attempt to maintain some independent Soviet positions. It is amazing that President Bush and his advisors have criticized that balance in the Soviet policy while failing to see the extreme bias in the American foreign policy. In fact, the American foreign policy team was the one that should be criticized for its unbalanced structure, which violated the principle of checks and balances that the founding fathers called for. Bush and Baker should have balanced the pro-Israeli team with a group of Arabists in the administration.
More peace initiatives continued to no avail. On December 4, Iraq ended the human shields’ problem by permitting foreigners, including Americans, to leave the country if they wished. Then, it asked for a broader dialogue about ending the Israeli occupation but the administration refused.[34]
On January 5, 1991 the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, arrived at Camp David and asked President Bush to allow him to mediate in the conflict. Instead, the President tried to talk him out of the mission. He thought that it would offer "Saddam hope that he could find another way out," and he did not want him to find any way out.[35]
The last peace initiative, which was also rejected by the Bush administration, was few days before the beginning of the war. On January 14, the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, expressed his government's desire to make a last-minute attempt to persuade the Iraqis to withdraw. Dumas proposed that the UN Security Council agree to a conference on the Middle East if Iraq would pull out of Kuwait. But President Bush, again and for the last time, rejected the proposal because he perceived it as a "linkage."[36]