I wonder why the Hartford Courant is the source for so much of this. I imagine someone should be talking to Jack Dolan and Dave Altimari...

http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20020121&slug=a...

Monday, January 21, 2002 - Page updated at 12:00 AM

Deadly specimens disappeared from Army research lab in '90s
By Jack Dolan and Dave Altimari

The Hartford Courant

Lab specimens of anthrax spores, Ebola virus and other pathogens disappeared from the Army's biological-warfare research facility in the early 1990s during a turbulent period of labor complaints and recriminations among rival scientists there, documents from an internal Army inquiry show.

The 1992 inquiry also found evidence that someone was secretly entering a laboratory late at night to conduct unauthorized research, apparently involving anthrax. A numerical counter on a piece of lab equipment had been rolled back to hide work done by the mystery researcher, who left the misspelled label "antrax" in the machine's electronic memory, according to the documents obtained by The Hartford Courant.

Experts disagree on whether the lost specimens pose a danger. An Army spokeswoman said they do not, because they would have been killed by chemicals used to prepare them for microscopic study. A prominent molecular biologist said, however, that anthrax spores could be retrieved from a treated specimen.

In addition, a scientist who once worked at the Army facility said that because of poor inventory controls, it is possible some of the specimens went missing while still viable, before being treated.

Not in dispute is what the incidents say about disorganization and lack of security in some quarters of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, or USAMRIID, at Fort Detrick, Md., in the 1990s. Fort Detrick is believed to be the original source of the Ames strain of anthrax used in the mail attacks last fall, and investigators have questioned people there and at a few other government labs and contractors.

It is unclear whether Ames was among the strains of anthrax in the 27 sets of specimens reported missing at Fort Detrick after an inventory in 1992.

One of the 27 sets was later found and is in the lab; an Army spokesman said it might have been in use when the inventory was taken. The fate of the rest remains unclear. In addition to anthrax and Ebola, the specimens included hantavirus, simian AIDS and two labeled "unknown" — an Army euphemism for classified research.

The 27 specimens were reported missing in February 1992, after a new officer, Lt. Col. Michael Langford, took command of what Fort Detrick brass viewed as a dysfunctional pathology lab. Langford, who is no longer at Fort Detrick, said he ordered an inventory after he recognized there was "little or no organization" and "little or no accountability" in the lab.

More troubling to Langford than the missing specimens was what investigators called "surreptitious" work being done in the pathology lab late at night and on weekends.

Mary Beth Downs told investigators she had come to work several times in January and February of 1992 to find that someone had been in the lab at odd hours, clumsily using the sophisticated electron microscope to conduct some kind of off-the-books research.

After one weekend that February, Downs discovered that someone had been in the lab using the microscope to take photos of slides and apparently had forgotten to reset a feature on the microscope that imprints each photo with a label. After taking a few pictures of her own slides that morning, Downs was surprised to see "Antrax 005" emblazoned on her negatives.

Downs also noted that an automatic counter on the camera, like an odometer on a car, had been rolled back to hide the fact pictures had been taken over the weekend. She wrote of her findings in a memo to Langford, noting that whoever was using the microscope was "either in a big hurry or didn't know what they were doing."

It is unclear if the Army ever got to the bottom of the incident, and some lab insiders believed concerns about it were overblown. Lab technician Charles Brown, who conducted the inventory for Langford, said the scientific process doesn't always follow a 9-to-5 schedule.

"People all over the base knew that they could come in at any time and get on the microscope," Brown said. "If you had security clearance, the guard isn't going to ask you if you are qualified to use the equipment. I'm sure people used it often without our knowledge."

Documents from the inquiry show that one unauthorized person who was observed entering the lab building at night was Langford's predecessor, Lt. Col. Philip Zack, who at the time no longer worked at Fort Detrick. A surveillance camera recorded Zack being let in at 8:40 p.m. on Jan. 23, 1992, apparently by Marian Rippy, a lab pathologist and close friend of Zack's, according to a report filed by a security guard.

Zack could not be reached for comment. In an interview last week, Rippy said that she doesn't remember letting Zack in, but that he occasionally stopped by after he was transferred off the base.

"After he left, he had no (authorized) access to the building. Other people let him in," she said. "He knew a lot of people there and he was still part of the military. I can tell you, there was no suspicious stuff going on there with specimens."

Zack left Fort Detrick in December 1991, after a controversy over allegations of unprofessional behavior by Zack, Rippy, Brown and others who worked in the pathology division. They were accused of harassing Egyptian-born Ayaad Assaad, a former Fort Detrick scientist who had extensive dealings with the lab and who later sued the Army, claiming discrimination.

Assaad said he had believed the harassment was behind him until October, when it suddenly surfaced after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

He said that is when the FBI contacted him, saying someone had mailed an anonymous letter — a few days before the existence of anthrax-laced mail became known — naming Assaad as a potential bioterrorist. After interviewing Assaad, FBI agents decided the note was a hoax.

But Assaad said he believes the note's timing makes the author a suspect in the anthrax attacks, and he is convinced that details of his work contained in the letter mean the author must be a former Fort Detrick colleague.

Brown said he doesn't know who sent the letter, but that Assaad's nationality and expertise in biological agents made him an obvious subject of concern after Sept. 11. Brown said the tipster might have been acting in the country's best interest.

"It probably was someone from Detrick," he said. "Some people are more patriotic than others."